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Abstract—Blockchain technology promises to revolutionize
manufacturing industries. For example, several supply-chain use-
cases may benefit from transparent asset tracking and automated
processes using smart contracts. Several real-world deployments
exist where the transparency aspect of a blockchain is both an
advantage and a disadvantage at the same time. The exposure of
assets and business interaction represent critical risks. However,
there are typically no confidentiality guarantees to protect the
smart contract logic as well as the processed data. Trusted exe-
cution environments (TEE) are an emerging technology available
in both edge or mobile-grade processors (e.g., ARM TRUSTZONE)
and server-grade processors (e.g., Intel SGX). TEEs shield both
code and data from malicious attackers. This practical experience
report presents TZ4FABRIC, an extension of Hyperledger Fabric
to leverage ARM TRUSTZONE for the secure execution of smart
contracts. Our design minimizes the trusted computing base
executed by avoiding the execution of a whole Hyperledger
Fabric node inside the TEE, which continues to run in untrusted
environment. Instead, we restrict it to the execution of only the
smart contract. The TZ4FABRIC prototype exploits the open-
source OP-TEE framework, as it supports deployments on cheap
low-end devices (e.g., Raspberry Pis). Our experimental results
highlight the performance trade-off due to the additional security
guarantees provided by ARM TRUSTZONE. TZ4FABRIC will be
released as open-source.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industry 4.0 [1] is among the primary pushing factor for
the adoption of blockchain technologies. Beyond the well-
known case of crypto-coins [2], several applications are being
developed and deployed across diverse domains, including
asset trading [3], insurance claim processing [4], cross-border
payments [5, 6], innovative money lending [7], transparent as-
set tracking along a given supply-chain (e.g., farm tracking [8]
or trusted food chain [9, 10]) and so on. Typically, all of these
scenarios involve a very large and heterogeneous set of mutu-
ally untrusted entities which still must collaborate to validate
and execute a common (application-specific) transaction.
When deployed over a blockchain infrastructure, the in-
teraction between these entities can be controlled by smart
contracts [11], i.e., programs that execute on top of a dis-
tributed ledger in a fully decentralized manner [12]. The
correct execution of the smart contract is enforced by consen-
sus protocols. Smart contracts can be deployed and executed
over “Internet of things” (IoT) devices in a verifiable and
efficient manner [13, 14]. Nevertheless, the confidentiality
of the contract itself is at stakes, especially in environments
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Fig. 1. Distributed ledger deployment over an heterogeneous set of devices.
A subset of them are shielded against malicious attackers using TEEs.
where the hardware and software integrity of the device can be
compromised by powerful attackers, including compromised
operating systems or malicious human operators.
Hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) of-
fer an exciting new opportunity to overcome such limita-
tions. In a nutshell, TEEs can isolate, by shielding, data and
code from malicious users, compromised system libraries or
thwarted operating systems. Notable examples include Intel
software guard extensions (SGX) for server-grade proces-
sors [15] and ARM TrustZone [16, 17, 18] for IoT- and edge-
based machines.
Figure 1 depicts our envisioned deployment scenario. An
heterogeneous and possibly distributed set of nodes join the
blockchain. A smart contract must be executed across a subset
of them and only few are shielded against attackers, who could
easily compromise the node and acquire sensitive data. Nodes
protected by TEEs are shielded against malicious attacks,
including a compromised operating system or an attacker with
physical access to the device. In the case of TEE-enabled
nodes, the processor package is the security perimeter.
Hyperledger Fabric private chaincode (FPC) [19, 20] is
an open-source project which support the execution of smart
contracts inside TEEs, specifically inside Intel SGX enclaves.
Since IoT devices are mostly small, (potentially) battery-
powered and embedding low-power processors [21, 22, 15],
FPC cannot be easily deployed in this context, which greatly
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hinders its applicability on our target deployment scenarios.
In this paper, we present the design, implementation and
evaluation of TZ4FABRIC, a prototype for Hyperledger Fab-
ric [23] chaincode execution that integrates with ARM Trust-
Zone. We discuss in particular the challenges that arise from
executing smart contracts in an embedded TEE much less
powerful than Intel SGX, as well as the limitations that result
from TZ4FABRIC’s design and the underlying platform.
As we detail further (Section IV), TZ4FABRIC architecture
is inspired by FPC, but it isolates the TEE component so that
only the smart contract execution can be offloaded to it. This
design allows not only to leverage ARM TRUSTZONE, but
also to possibly extend TZ4FABRIC to future (yet unreleased)
TEEs, by leveraging our modular architecture. We believe this
modularity represents a major differentiation, but can also be
seen as a supplement for FPC’s design.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
background on blockchain and Hyperledger Fabric, as well
as ARM TrustZone and the OP-TEE runtime. Section III
describes TZ4FABRIC’s threat model. We then describe the
architecture of our system in Section IV and elaborate on
its most important implementation details in Section V. Sec-
tion VI presents the evaluation of our prototype, reporting
on performance as well as energy-related results. We finally
discuss related work in Section VII and conclude with some
open challenges in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
Blockchain and Smart-contracts. A blockchain is a type
of distributed ledger [11]. It records data (i.e., transactions)
in a decentralized way. The data is appended in blocks and
connected (“chained”) via hashes. Each transaction is signed
by the party it was invoked. Before appending transactions,
nodes of the blockchain network must validate and agree on a
unique order of these transactions. The latter can be achieved
via some consensus mechanism [24, 25, 26, 27]. Thanks to
its characteristics, a blockchain guarantees availability, trans-
parency, immutability and integrity of the stored data. Data
privacy and scalability are rather limited in blockchains.
We distinguish between the following two types of
blockchains: permissionless (also called public) and permis-
sioned [28]. In a public blockchain (e.g., Bitcoin [29] and
Ethereum [30]), anyone can participate in the network (read
data from the blockchain, invoke transactions, validate trans-
actions, etc.), whereas in a permissioned blockchain (e.g.,
Ripple [31] and Hyperledger Fabric [32]), the access of the
network is restricted and entities are known.
The concept of smart contracts was described first by Nick
Szabo [12]: A smart contract is a computerized transaction
protocol that executes the terms of a contract. With the
emergence of blockchain technology, this idea was put into
practice. A smart contract is an agreement translated into
program code and stored in a blockchain network [33, 34]. It
is automatically executed when the defined conditions are met.
As they are integrated into a blockchain, smart contracts inherit
from its features of availability, transparency, immutability and
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Fig. 2. Architecture of Hyperledger Fabric.
integrity [11]. Furthermore, they are efficient, reduce cost and
save time bypassing any third party. However, the execution of
smart contracts present several challenges, e.g., it is not trivial
to guarantee data privacy, avoid bugs in the contract code or
protect from attacks, as it happened to Ethereum [35].
Hyperledger Fabric (HF) [32, 23] is a permissioned
blockchain supporting smart contracts. It belongs to the Hyper-
ledger [36] open source project that includes different frame-
works and tools related to blockchain technologies. In HF, a
smart contract is called chaincode. Currently, developers can
choose among three general-purpose programming languages
(Go, Java and Node.js) to implement chaincodes. To facilitate
deployments, HF uses Docker containers. There exist three
types of nodes in a Hyperledger Fabric network: clients,
peers and orderers. fig. 2 presents the high-level architecture
and workflow of HF. Before a chaincode function can get
called (invoked), it must be installed (put on the file system)
and instantiated at the peer. A client (application) can send
a request (transaction proposal) to the peers for invoking
a chaincode function (Figure 2-Ê and Figure 2-Ë). In a
first phase, i.e., execution or endorsement, the peer executes
the called chaincode function (Figure 2-ËÀ and Figure 2-
ËÁ) and sends a response back to the client (Figure 2-Ì).
The transaction response is signed by the peer and contains
the execution response message, as well as the readset and
writeset. The readset represents all values of the keys a peer
has queried from the ledger via GetState during the execu-
tion. The writeset contains all key-value pair updates a peer
has generated via PutState. When the client has collected
enough responses as defined by the so called endorsement
policy it sends them to the orderer (Figure 2-Í). The orderer
puts the transaction into blocks and sends the block to the
peers (Figure 2-ÍÀ). This is the ordering phase. In the third
validation phase, the peers check if the endorsement policy
is satisfied and if there is no read-write conflict between
the different transactions. Finally, they put the transaction on
the ledger (Figure 2-ÍÁ). The ledger has two components: a
blockchain and a world state. The world state is a pluggable
database, to store and efficiently retrieve later on the current
values of the keys in the blockchain.
ARM TrustZone provides the hardware components for
enabling TEEs on ARM processors [16, 37, 17]. OP-TEE [38]
is a popular open source runtime with native support for ARM
TRUSTZONE. OP-TEE follows the TEE architecture and API
standardized by GlobalPlatform (GP) [39]. ARM TRUSTZONE
enables a single TEE—called secure world—per system [40].
The other part of the system is called normal world. The
processor can be in one of two security states: secure (for
the secure world) and non-secure (for the normal world).
Switching happens via a secure monitor call (SMC). System
resources are strictly isolated: the normal world cannot access
the resources (e.g., memory, peripherals, etc.) reserved for the
secure world. During the bootstrap of the secure world, a chain
of trust is established and there is an integrity check of the
secure world software images—a process called secure boot.
Additional details regarding OP-TEE framework are given
while discussing TZ4FABRIC implementation in Section V.
III. THREAT MODEL
For our thread model we consider a powerful attacker with
administrative rights as well as physical access to all nodes
supporting ARM TRUSTZONE. There, we rely on the protec-
tion mechanisms offered by the TEE to shield the privacy of
the smart-contract code, as well as its privacy upon execution.
We further assume that the operating system and the user space
in the normal world cannot be trusted. However, we do assume
that the TEE, which includes bootloader, firmware, OP-TEE,
and the secure monitor are trusted. The Fabric blockchain
network can run different consensus algorithms, among which
PBFT [41], and can therefore tolerate Byzantine failures.
Since ARM TRUSTZONE does not natively support remote
attestation mechanisms, an attacker might try to compromise
the contract before it is executed. The chaincode is stored
in the normal world as a trusted application and signed with
the build key. In addition, it is possible to encrypt the trusted
application to add further security measures. Without the build
key an attacker cannot easily tamper with the chaincode, as its
signature is verified in the secure world before execution. Fur-
thermore, this attack can be mitigated by integrating schemes
such as Fides [42]. Note as well that ARM TRUSTZONE does
not provide integrity protection at runtime, hence TZ4FABRIC
cannot easily prevent unnoticed malicious corruptions of the
chaincode.
While recent side-channel attacks [43, 44] have been un-
veiled against ARM TRUSTZONE, and mitigations continue to
be released [45], we consider them out of the scope of this
work, as also mentioned in [46]. Mitigations will eventually
be released by means of architectural microcode updates
(as happened for Intel SGX to mitigate Spectre/Meltdown
attacks [47]).
IV. TZ4FABRIC ARCHITECTURE
ARM TZ-enabled devices are typically low-power embed-
ded devices of which many are battery powered. Hence,
these devices have to get by with limited resources in terms
of persistent and volatile memory. Given these limitations,
it is oftentimes challenging to port applications or systems
that are being used in a desktop or sever environment – in
particular if these tend to have many dependencies. In our case,
TZ4FABRIC depends on packages such as Go programming
language (golang) environment, Hyperledger Fabric, OP-TEE,
as well as gRPC [48]. Not only do these packages (and
their dependencies) require several hundreds of megabyte of
persistent memory, but also do they need a few hundred
megabytes of volatile memory at runtime. While there are IoT
devices that can satisfy these requirements (e.g., Raspberry Pi
models), many cannot. For this reason we have settled for an
approach where we decouple large system components (i.e.,
Hyperledger Fabric and Docker) from lightweight security-
relevant components (i.e., chaincode) by means of a proxy.
The design of TZ4FABRIC is inspired by the architecture of
Fabric private chaincode (FPC) [19, 20]. In our design sensi-
tive information can be contained in the chaincode operation
and its response, which have to be shielded from malicious
attacks. We therefore offload the chaincode to a TEE-enabled
embedded device. Additionally, the ledger might hold sensitive
information, which could be shielded by the approach used
in FPC. However, for our prototype we did not shield the
ledger using Intel SGX. To facilitate our design, we divide
TZ4FABRIC into three major components: (1) a wrapper that
resides as a chaincode at a Fabric peer, (2) a proxy and (3) the
chaincode itself. The wrapper communicates with the proxy
via gRPC. The proxy and the chaincode run on a ARM-based
environment with TrustZone. In particular, the proxy resides
in the normal world, whereas the chaincode is located in the
secure world. Our design leverages the OP-TEE framework
to drive the interaction between between the proxy and the
chaincode.
The wrapper is installed and instantiated as chaincode and
is used as an interface towards the peer and the ledger. It
forwards incoming invocations from the clients to the chain-
code in the secure world, handles the communication towards
the ledger and sends transaction responses back to the Fabric
peer. The proxy acts as an intermediary and forwards the calls
between the the wrapper and the chaincode. It is responsible
for context switching from the normal world to the secure
world. A chaincode implements the blockchain application
logic and is invoked by the clients via the wrapper. During
execution, a chaincode has access to the ledger via getState
and putState commands through the proxy.
Our design allows us to instantiate and run multiple chain-
codes in a single secure world, which provides isolation
from the normal word, i.e., the operating system does not
have direct access to the chaincode resources and can only
interact with a chaincode through the proxy. However, as
all chaincodes reside in the same secure world, there are no
isolation guarantees among the chaincodes, something that
is instead provided by FPC as a result of the ability to run
multiple SGX enclaves on the same processor.
Our prototype focuses on the inclusion of ARM TZ in
Hyperledger Fabric. This means that we have not implemented
a mechanism in order to replicate chaincodes in our network.
The principal reason for this choice lies in the execution of
chaincodes inside ARM TZ. Chaincodes are executed in the
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Fig. 3. Architecture of OP-TEE (trusted parts in darker shades of green).
prototype as trusted applications (see Section V) inside OP-
TEE. This implies that the chaincode is compiled using the
same build system as the OP-TEE running on the machine and
that the trusted application is signed with the original build key
and optionally encrypted. Therefore, every chaincode would
have to be compiled to a trusted application and installed on
the target machine, before it could be invoked.
Alternatively, implementing a virtual machine as trusted
application inside ARM TZ that is capable to execute smart
contracts (e.g., Solidity [49]) would overcome the previously
explained restriction. Chaincodes could then be replicated on
the target machine and directly be invoked without having to
go through the process of generating a trusted application. In
the prototype we have generated a trusted application for the
chaincode and we have deployed it on all ARM TZ-enabled
proxies. As hinted at before, there is also the possibility
to use smart contracts which are written in domain-specific
languages (DSL) (e.g., Solidity) and that are executed by a
virtual machine (e.g., Ethereum Virtual Machine). Since our
goal is to shield the chaincode with a TEE, this would also
require that the virtual machines executing the chaincode is
shielded as well. Such an approach would inevitably increase
the TCB and take up some of the already limited resources on
embedded device. On top of that our design would strongly
depend on the design of the DSL and the potential flaws that
come with it.
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Our implementation leverages the OP-TEE framework, de-
picted in Figure 3. OP-TEE contains the following compo-
nents: OP-TEE Client, OP-TEE Linux driver and OP-TEE OS.
The OS of the normal world is also referred to as rich exe-
cution environment (REE). The OP-TEE Linux driver provides
the driver for the normal world. An application running inside
the normal world is referred to as host application. The TEE
client API and the TEE internal API enable the communication
between a host application and an application of the secure
world, i.e., the trusted application (TA). Both APIs are defined
by GP [50, 51]: the TEE client API is implemented by the OP-
TEE client component, the TEE internal API is implemented
by the OP-TEE OS.
Interactions between the different components of the system
happens as follows (see also Figure 5). Before initiating any
communication, the host application establishes a connection
towards the secure world (TEEC_InitializeContext) and
open a session towards the TA (TEEC_OpenSession) with
the unique identifier of the TA (UUID) as parameter. Then,
the host application can call functions of the TA with the TEE
client APIs TEEC_InvokeCommand, as this allows to pass data
between the host application and the TA via shared memory
reference or by value.
Once the host application has finished communication with
the TA, it needs to close the session (TEEC_CloseSession)
and finalize the context (TEEC_FinalizeContext) to release
resources.
In our implementation, all TZ4FABRIC components are
deployed within containers. Since there is no native Docker
support in the normal world (untrusted part) of OP-TEE,
the peer is decoupled from the ARM TRUSTZONE node.
Communication between a chaincode_wrapper at the peer
(TZ4FABRIC specific wrapper around the actual chaincode)
and a chaincode inside the secure world is enabled via gRPC
remote procedure calls and through the API provided by OP-
TEE between the normal and secure world.
It is finally worth mentioning that the availability of remote
attestation is one of the most important difference between
Intel SGX and ARM TRUSTZONE with OP-TEE, where the
former natively supports it [52, 53, 15]. While this represents
one of the main limitation of TZ4FABRIC compared to its
SGX-based FPC counterpart, we highlight in Section III
possible workarounds. The code of TZ4FABRIC is released as
open-source and available from https://github.com/piachristel/
open-source-fabric-optee-chaincode.
VI. EVALUATION
This section presents the experimental evaluation of the
TZ4FABRIC prototype. Our main goal is to show the perfor-
mance trade-offs of the system. In particular, we investigate the
throughput and latency impact of our implementation. Further,
to clarify the performance penalties of the system, we conduct
a latency breakdown to identify the bottleneck in the system,
as well as energy measurements.
A. Experimental settings
Each experiment is executed with OP-TEE (v3.8) using
QEMU for ARM TZ emulation and with OP-TEE running
on the Raspberry Pi. We use a set of 27 server machines with
two Intel Xeon CPU L5420 at 2.5GHz and 8GB of RAM.
The orderer, 8 wrapper and 8 proxy (QEMU instance)
each run on their own server. The Raspberry Pi model 3B+
embeds a ARM TRUSTZONE (ARMv8-A). We employ the
Linux powersave governor on all Raspberry Pi. Hence, we
emulate the same processor using QEMU. Specifically, QEMU
emulates a Cortex-A53 CPU with symmetric multiprocessing
(SMP) set to 4 cores, and the number of trusted threads in
OP-TEE is set to 4 in order to have an emulated environment
to closely mimic the one found in the physical Raspberry Pi
3B+. Clients invoke transactions from 8 dedicated machines.
We use two auxiliary machines in order to record the
power consumption of the different types of nodes that form
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Fig. 4. Read throughput and read latency of the coffee tracking chaincode for increasing numbers of clients.
our Fabric network. We rely on a LINDY iPower Control
2x6M power distribution unit (PDU) to monitor energy con-
sumptions. Due to the limited number of available ports, we
restrict the measurements the following nodes: the orderer, 3
wrapper, and 3 proxy (QEMU instances). The 8 Raspberry Pi
3B+ are all equipped with a Raspberry Pi PoE-HAT1 and make
use of 802.3.af Power-over-Ethernet [54]. They are connected
to a Ubiquiti Networks UniFi USW-48P-750 switch, which
also allows to directly query their power consumption. The
nodes are connected via 1 Gbit/s switched network and run
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS, except for the client machines which run
Ubuntu 20.04 LTS. The clocks of the auxiliary and the client
machines are synchronized using NTP, which is necessary
in order to relate the power measurements to the benchmark
measurements in our setup.
We implemented and deploy in our benchmarks a simple
chaincode toy-example, e.g., tracking the coffee consumption
in an office. Clients submit transactions to track their coffee
consumption and query the current coffee statics. The chain-
code and the proxy are written in ISO C and C++, whereas
the clients and the wrapper are written in golang. Our coffee
tracking chaincode is simple enough to conduct a read/write
benchmark on the Fabric blockchain network. Each client
machine runs a peer. We exploit its capability to connect to
a remote peer in the TZ4FABRIC network. Clients repeatedly
invoke transactions on the their local peer which get forwarded
to the Fabric network peer.
The communication between the wrapper and the proxy
uses gRPC (v.1.28.1).
The execution time of a client measurement begins before
the client invokes the first transaction and terminates after
the client has received the corresponding response from the
last transaction. Furthermore, for each client we record the
number of invoked transactions. We support experimental re-
producibility, and detailed instructions to setup and reproduce
these experiments are given at TZ4FABRIC git repository
(Section V).
1https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/poe-hat/, last access: May 29 2020
B. TCB Size
The trusted computing base (TCB) consists of all compo-
nents residing in the secure world. With our design we limit
this to the chaincode and other components (i.e., wrapper,
proxy). The peers are considered to be untrusted and thus
run outside the secure world. In total, our prototype contains
∼22 000 lines of untrusted C++ code (most of it generated by
gRPC) and only ∼400 lines of trusted C code. Additionally,
the OP-TEE OS itself consists of ∼233 600 lines of C and
assembler code, as well as the Trusted Firmware-A which
sums to ∼31 400 lines of C and assembler code. For OP-TEE
OS and Trusted Firmware-A we considered only the platform-
specific source code.
In contrast, the peer consists of ∼80 000 lines of Go
code (v1.4.1). This shows that by only executing the chaincode
itself inside the TEE and not the entire peer, we can drastically
minimize the TCB and thereby reduce the attack surface.
C. Throughput and Latency Impact
We begin by measuring the throughput and latency of
TZ4FABRIC, by deploying and running the coffee tracking
chaincode. We perform multiple rounds with up to 8 clients.
In every round the clients repeatedly invoke transactions over
at least 30 seconds. We expect the throughput to increase with
increasing number of clients, while latency to be stable until
the number of clients matches the CPU cores in our machine.
A preliminary evaluation using a single peer and a single
Raspberry Pi 3B has otherwise shown that the throughput only
slightly increases, by approximately ×1.2, from 1 to 2 clients
and then already stagnates.
To investigate this unexpected result and identify the root
cause of the bottlenecks, we conducted the experiment with
different scenarios. Our baseline consists of all components
(i.e., chaincode, clients, etc.) running in the normal (untrusted)
world on the same machine. This scenario does not benefit
from the security properties introduced by TrustZone, and
it does not use the gRPC messaging library. In a second
scenario we place the chaincode in the secure world, but run
the components on the same machine. Finally, we locate the
clients and the wrapper on a dedicated machine, and proxy
and chaincode runs with QEMU and on a Raspberry Pi. SMP
is set to 4 to match the number of cores on the Raspberry Pi.
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Figure 4 summaries the throughput and latency for the
baseline scenario and the final scenario.
In the baseline scenario, we look into the impact of gRPC.
We tried different configurations and the best results are
achieved with NUM_CQS set to half the number of cores, and
MIN_POLLERS and MAX_POLLERS with the default values. Us-
ing these settings, throughput increases by ×1.9 for 2 clients,
×2.5 for 4 clients and ×2.8 for 8 clients. As these factors are
far above those observed in our preliminary experiment, we
can therefore rule out gRPC as the bottleneck.
In the second scenario, we note the throughput to increase
only by ×1.3 for 2 clients, ×1.4 for 4 clients and ×1.5 for 8
clients. These factors are slightly above our observation during
our preliminary experiment, but still well below the baseline
case. We therefore conclude that the bottleneck mainly origi-
nates from the secure world calls.
In the final scenario we observe that the throughput does not
improve with an increasing number of clients in case of the
Raspberry Pi. In contrast with QEMU, there is an increase
of ×1.2 from 1 to 2 clients. For more clients, throughput
stagnates. This is due to the bottleneck we have already
observed in the second scenario. In contrast, the throughput
of the baseline increases up to 8 clients. With the proxy and
the wrapper running on the Raspberry Pi, we can increase
throughput by ×3.1 for 8 clients compared to 1 client. For
QEMU, it is increased by ×2.6 from 1 to 8 clients.
Considering the experiment on the Raspberry Pi for 1 client,
the throughput of the baseline is about 27× higher compared
to original TZ4FABRIC. In case of 8 clients, we even have
an increase of about ×130. For QEMU, the difference is less
extreme: the baseline throughput is between 5× to 10× higher
compared to the original TZ4FABRIC. The observations show
that the execution of the chaincode inside the secure world
comes with non-negligible cost in terms of throughput.
D. Latency Breakdown
Next, we provide a detailed breakdown of the latency
overheads incurred by TZ4FABRIC. We divide the execution
latency in several phases as shown in Figure 5:
A initializes the wrapper; B initializes the proxy and
includes TEEC_OpenSession to allocate memory; D prepares
GetState commands in the chaincode; E forwards the com-
mand via GetStateRequest to the wrapper; G processes
GetStateRequest; H post-processes GetStateResponse
in the proxy; J executes the response message in the
chaincode; K concludes the chaincode execution via a
InvocationResponse; L releases the resources, for closing
the session (TEEC_CloseSession) and for finalizing the
context (TEEC_FinalizeContext) at the proxy; M finalizes
execution at the wrapper. The phases C, I, N, and O are
measured for calculating the round-trip times.
We perform this experiment with the same settings as in the
original TZ4FABRIC experiment.
For both settings with QEMU and the Raspberry Pi,
phase B contributes up 65-75% of the total time. We can
observe that the vast majority of phase B is needed for
TEEC_OpenSession. We leverage this information to identify
throughput bottlenecks observed throughout our evaluation.
The measured latency for the phases D, E, G, H, J, K and
M are smaller than 1 ms, and overall contribute to less than
1% of the total latency.
E. Throughput-Latency Benchmark
In this benchmark we evaluate the coffee tracking chaincode
on the setup described in Section VI. We perform multiple
rounds with up to 128 clients. In every round the clients
repeatedly invoke read or write transactions over a duration
of 5 minutes. Clients are distributed evenly among the 8
available peers. We use the same naming convention for the
scenarios introduced in Section VI-C with the exception that
all components (excluding clients) run on their own server.
The throughput-latency plot is shown in Figure 6. We
observe that for both read and write transactions, the baselines
are very similar to each other. In the baseline scenario, the
chaincode is executed on the wrapper in the normal world
and not shielded by ARM TRUSTZONE. There is also no
communication going on from the wrapper to the proxy
since this scenario does not make use of gRPC. Therefore,
the setup for these two baselines is identical, in line with our
measurements.
Note that our benchmark are not saturating the system
with the baseline settings. We consistently observe across
transactions that the ARM TRUSTZONE-enabled environments
start saturating already with 8 clients around 65 tx/s, which
corresponds to one client per wrapper-proxy pair. This
observation was made earlier during the preliminary evalu-
ation in Section VI-C. Client transactions on the chaincode
are essentially invoked sequentially. One reason for the low
throughput is the substantial overhead due to shielding TAs
with ARM TZ. There is also potential to improve the load
times for TAs with OP-TEE by caching their contexts and
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Fig. 6. Throughput-latency, transactions and transaction energy for read/write invocations. Top row are read transactions, bottom row are write transactions.
session to improve reusability. We intend to explore these
optimizations in future work.
Using a shielded QEMU instance (emulating ARM TRUST-
ZONE), the latency increases by a factor of 2.5 for reads and
by a factor of 2.6 for writes respectively, before reaching the
saturation point. On the Raspberry Pi the latency increases
by a factor of 2.0 for reads and by a factor of 2.1 for writes
before reaching the saturation point. While the throughput and
latency of read transactions is better by a factor of 1.04 than
write transactions with QEMU, the throughput and latency
of read transaction improves by a factor of 1.02 than write
transactions on the Raspberry Pi.
F. Energy consumption
Finally, we conclude our experimental evaluation with a
study of the power footprint of TZ4FABRIC. We achieve this
by recording the power consumption of the nodes running
the Fabric network with the coffee tracking chaincode with
TZ4FABRIC. We expect the execution to be faster and require
less energy per transaction when running OP-TEE on the
Raspberry Pi as compared to emulating ARM TRUSTZONE
with QEMU.
The energy consumption of the orderer, wrapper, and
proxy are depicted in Figure 7, and we distinguish between
read (top) and write (bottom) transactions. We observe that
the energy consumption across the nodes during the entire
benchmark is rather stable, only slightly increasing when the
number of clients grow. There are two exceptions occurring
under different situations for 16 clients: (1) the orderer and
wrapper energy for the baselines rise (Figure 7-[a,b,d,e]) as
well as (2) the energy of the proxy (Figure 7-[c,f]).
The first exception is an indication of saturation of the
Fabric network. This is further supported by the decline of
average transactions per client in the network and the fact that
the system starts approaching the saturation point as shown
in Figure 6. Both the orderer and wrapper nodes begin to
struggle for resources under the load of the increasing number
of clients.
The second exception is a result of the ARM TRUSTZONE
world-switching overhead when a chaincode is invoked. As
the load increases the performance governor has to increase
the frequency and voltage of the CPU over longer intervals.
Although barely visible, the Raspberry Pi is experiencing
the same issue. This is better highlighted in the energy
per transaction (see Figure 6), where the energy increases
proportionally to the QEMU instance. This steadily raises the
energy consumption of the proxy machines by a factor of
1.25 with QEMU and by a factor of 1.05 on a Raspberry Pi
beyond the saturation point. In terms of energy there is no
significant difference between read and write transactions on
both platforms.
VII. RELATED WORK
Smart contract execution with a TEE: Apart from FPC,
there are some other works about confidential smart contract
execution with a TEE. Confidential consortium framework
(CCF) [55], Ekiden [56], ShadowEth [57] and private data
objects (PDOs) [58], just to mention a few recent ones. In
contrast to TZ4FABRIC, they all use Intel SGX as underlying
TEE technology for a (prototype) implementation. The authors
of Ekiden state that their technology may use any TEE which
is similar to Intel SGX and supports attestation. Furthermore,
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Fig. 7. Energy consumption of nodes in the Fabric network. Top row are read transactions, bottom row are write transactions.
SGX can provide means to mitigate rollback attacks [59], for
which the necessary hardware support might not be provided
in ARM TRUSTZONE.
Confidentiality in context of blockchain and IoT: In
TZ4FABRIC, we are concerned with confidentiality of smart
contracts (their logic) and data in context of IoT networks.
Some other research efforts are concerned with the confiden-
tiality of data produced and processed by IoT devices and
stored on the blockchain.
Trust for data generated by IoT devices: AnyLedger [60]
is a platform for connecting physical devices to the blockchain.
The key feature is an ARM TZ based wallet for IoT devices.
The key generation, the private key storage and the process
of signing (smart contract) transactions are all placed inside
the secure world of ARM TZ. Hence, the AnyLedger wallet
guarantees that the IoT data hash/address (linking to the
interplanetary file system IPFS) placed on the blockchain is
integrity protected and authenticated. Furthermore, the data
stored on the IPFS is encrypted. AnyLedger is pluggable to
any blockchain technology (for example Ethereum or Bitcoin).
[61] is another system which equips IoT devices with a TEE
to guarantee integrity and confidentiality of the IoT data.
Confidential computation: BeeKeeper 2.0 [62] is a
blockchain network for IoT systems that consists of IoT
devices, servers and validator nodes. It enables IoT devices
to share data with each other. Furthermore, the devices can
use the servers for performing homomorphic computations
on encrypted data. The computation result is verified by the
validator nodes and recorded on the blockchain after successful
verification. Since homomorphic encryption is used, the con-
fidentiality of the data sent to and processed by the servers
is guaranteed. BeeKeeper 2.0 can be added on top of any
blockchain technology (Hyperledger Fabric, Ethereum etc.).
In the paper, authors use Hyperledger Fabric for deployment.
ARM TZ and blockchain technology: Some relates sys-
tems use ARM TZ not for smart contracts directly but in
context of the blockchain technology (which is the underlying
technology of smart contracts). Secure blockchain lightweight
wallets (SBLWT) [63] use ARM TZ to guarantee confiden-
tiality and integrity for the information generated and stored
in the Bitcoin wallet (wallet’s private key, wallet addresses,
block headers used for Simplified Payment Verification). The
synchronization of the block headers and the verification
process of the transactions is executed in the secure world
to avoid any manipulation by an attacker. SBLWT is safer
than the often used software wallets but still more portable
than hardware wallets. An implementation of SBLWT using
ARM TZ with OP-TEE has been deployed on Raspberry Pi
3 Model B. The TrustZone-backed Bitcoin Wallet [64] also
uses the ARM TZ technology for protecting sensitive Bitcoin
wallet information.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN CHALLENGES
This work reports on our practical experience with the
combination of Hyperledger Fabric and ARM TRUSTZONE, a
particularly useful setting in the context of IoT. We presented
the design and implementation of a prototype, TZ4FABRIC, for
Hyperledger Fabric chaincode execution with ARM TRUST-
ZONE and OP-TEE, demonstrating a fully-working mechanism
to execute smart contracts inside the secure world. Our design
minimizes the trusted computing base executed by avoiding
the execution of a whole Hyperledger Fabric node inside
the TEE, which is assumed to be running in an untrusted
environment. Instead, we restrict it to the execution of only
the smart contract. The TZ4FABRIC prototype exploits the
open-source OP-TEE framework, as it supports deployments
on cheap low-end devices (e.g., Raspberry Pis). However,
we also report on several challenges faced while building
our prototype, in particular the missing support for remote
attestation in ARM TRUSTZONE and OP-TEE, and missing
hardware support for critical security features.
Our experimental results highlight the performance and
energy trade-off due to additional security guarantees pro-
vided by ARM TRUSTZONE. We leave the final design and
replication of chaincodes in our prototype as future work. The
TZ4FABRIC is released as open-source.
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